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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This rutin!" ha;, j ur i sd i rt i on over this appeal oursuant to 
Section 78-2-2 (1)(j ) of: Utah Code Annotated and Eiil e • of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. 11 i a t: :: i: !:: acta oi I, • :lc:> I J tal i Coi ir ts fo] 1 ow the doctri ne of 
Lex I .oci Delicti where the injury occurred out of state? 
I I f t Jtah does f o ] 1 ow the doctr ine o f Lex Loc I De 1 i ct i , 
; , r J s Wor k e i s Compel i s a t i oi i he t pr o \ r:i de ai l e x c e p t i o n to t h i s 
r u l e ? 
111 I f U t a h d o e s n o t £ o 1 1 ow t h e d o c t r i n e o £ Le x Lo c i 
* \ ] i c t i
 f i s p ] a i i I t :i f f s a c t i o i i s t :li ] ] b a r r e d I 11 i d e i: t h e s u b s t a i I t i a 1 
contacts or interests rule? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review on appeal Is to review the trial 
• ::ourt' s conc 1 usI on of 1 aw £or correctness. Mountain Fu e 1 S upp 1 y v. 
Salt Lake City, 7 52 I 2d 884 (1 J tal i 1 988) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Nevada Revi sed Statutes, Section 61 6 , 2 7 0 (11 986) . 
(attached as Exhibit --") 
1 
2. Nevada Revised Statutes, Section 616.085 (1986). 
(attached as Exhibit "B") 
3. Nevada Revised Statutes, Section 616.260(1), (3) (1986). 
(attached as Exhibit "C") 
4. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62, 1953 as amended, 
(attached as Exhibit "D") 
5. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-54, 1953 as amended, 
(attached as Exhibit "E") 
6. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-44, 1953 as amended, 
(attached as Exhibit "F") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case: 
This action was brought by plaintiff under common-law tort 
principles, for personal injuries he sustained while working on a 
construction project in Nevada. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion 
and record citation, this action was not brought pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-62. 
The owner of the project was the state of Nevada. The alleged 
negligent act occurred in Nevada. The injury occurred in Nevada. 
Nevada was the center of the parties' relationship. At least one 
of the subcontractors, a third-party defendant, was a Nevada 
corporation. See R. 40, 106. 
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B. Proceedings below: 
This in an appeal from, final orders of the Third Judicial 
Di st i Let Coiii/i J n .in 1 leu .1 i I t. I a k e Coui i/t;;r , Sta te of I If al: i, be for e 
the Honorable Pat B Brian, District Cour t .3 udge, dated November 
2 6, 199] granti ng Layton's Moti on to Dismiss and Steel Deck's 
Mo t:i on for Si immary J I ldgmei it w hi cl: I were docketed "w i • . £ 
the District Court of Salt Lake County, St.^rc -:» - • ah on or about 
the same date, and from all Rul'i.ss ctnu uiaeib ui that court 
affecting or pertaining to the rights claimed and asserted by the 
plaintiff (R. 321-325; 326-329). 
Defendants Layton and steel Deck are the only defenda o 
have been served and who bavp e n t p r ^ an appearance ^n ;,.., ..i'lU:. . 
Defendant ^ir -fc.t ^GU< I uro i-j . J-- :* * 'mi n : nt as 
Bu. i ] t -R ' 1 
served ana entered appearance .1^ t third-party defendant the 
underlying third-party act]'- cought ^ * against the 
Christense , v^ a.i company ;e,i^v^u * * the 
successc: orporat : r c: -; t--ir- Concrete. rt.-. * :r.: -iqhar, 
(j ia i nt i * ' - i : : : - t 
is not i party appeal * -r,t*-ti a.3. a tnird-party 
defendant, is a Utah corporation. 
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Hearing on Layton's Motion to Dismiss and Steel Deck's Motion 
for Summary Judgment was held before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
Third District Court Judge, on November 8, 1991. Prior to the 
hearing, Layton and Steel Deck submitted memoranda in support of 
their respective motions. Shaw submitted memoranda in opposition 
to each of the motions. The court permitted oral argument and 
thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision, containing its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and its Order dated November 26, 1991 
granting both Motions and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 110-
120A; 121-138; 139-149; 165-174; 193-194; 195-237; 242-254; 256-
272; 321-329). 
This matter was previously on appeal as evidenced by a Notice 
of Appeal filed December 26, 1991 (R. 345-46). This court, on its 
own motion, dismissed that appeal on the grounds that the 
plaintiff-appellant had not obtained certification of the Orders of 
dismissal as final judgments as required by Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, that appeal (Case No. 
920685-CA) was dismissed without prejudice. 
Based on a motion and stipulation, the parties to this matter 
obtained a certification from the trial court as required by Rule 
54(b) which was dated July 8, 1993. A Notice of Appeal was filed 
by the plaintiff with the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah on July 20, 1993. This case is now 
4 
before thIs court for cons iderat ioi 1 of the Issues raIsed by that 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 Plaintiff claims he was injured I n a construction accident 
while working on a project * . L . . -. Nevada state penitentiary in 
E] y Ne\ ada (R 1 22) . 
2. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed as 
a bri ck-layer for I iar M & Higham Masonry, a sub-contractor on the 
project. Id» 
3. Defendant Layton Construction Company was the general 
contractor on the pr oject pursuant to a contract with the state of 
• Id. 
4. Defendant Layton Construction, had entered i nto a 
subcontract * * Harv & Hi ghaut Masonry ; perforin "all masonry 
wor l« " on !»• , ul idi , hill tin1 < uiisKJ*1 M\ nt line Mill ion one 
Hundred Fifteen Thousand Dollars, Id. 
5. As a result of his accident, plaintiff claimed and was 
paid worker's compensate on bene?.- ;h's Worker's 
Compensation Act (R. 14 2) , 
6. The State of Nevada was the owner of tl le $1 7 million 
• - ar construction project and entered into a contract wi th the 
General Contractor, Layton Construction Company. (R. 14 0 ) , 
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7. All of the alleged acts which give rise to plaintiff's 
tort cause of action occurred exclusively at Ely, Nevada. (R. 13) . 
8. Plaintiff purposefully chose to work for Harv & Higham in 
Nevada even though he could have worked for that company in Salt 
Lake City, Ogden, or Orem, Utah. (R. 377). 
9. By working in Nevada rather than Utah, plaintiff received 
substantially more money. (R. 378). 
10. In order to earn this higher income, plaintiff joined a 
Nevada union in Reno, Nevada. (R. 378). 
11. In each subcontract entered between Layton Construction 
and its subcontractors, Layton Construction required all 
subcontractors to provide worker's compensation insurance for their 
employees while working in the State of Nevada. (R. 45), 50 and 
55) . 
12. At least one of the subcontractors at the project, Bilt-
Rite Concrete, Inc., was a Nevada company. (R. 40, 106). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff filed his complaint in Utah as a tort cause of 
action for personal injuries he received while working in Nevada. 
Utah courts apply the doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti in determining 
which state's laws should apply to plaintiff's accident. Under 
that doctrine, Nevada law bars plaintiff's suit because Layton 
6 
Construction Company Is considered his statutory employer and, 
therefore f is immune from suit. 
I Jt.ili I'M ii U M I i mipML-.ii I IDII a I Inn In orovides +"hat 
employees hircMi in Utah ljuf injured out at state are entitjea to 
receive "compensation" under Utah law, aoplies only to w - 3 
compensation benefits. That statutory provision, however, does not 
create a riqht for the employee to maintain common-law tort action 
against his employer. 
Even if this court w^r^ ^ >^ ^dopt- niair»t-iffe "substantial 
contacts" or "interests" approach t:.* ri-\* . . * '. on . i be • :,* ~:\ *•«.-. 
j n this case, i\. * * * «• z 
occurred i™ Nevada. lleged negligent act caus„ i those 
injuries -. . - occurred . Nevada. The plaintiff purposefully 
leave
 t . - \.n ana t r " Nevada v. -irr. ru^e none") v :re 
importantly * <- <r.^ ^  w? N^- *d • -1 * h^ <•.'-•. * * - ^n^t* :'-t:--*n 
] : < ' ; 1 
Company t . * a state penitent:3 , , Nevada. 
Additionally •• subcontractors » ; -
 3 
( : <3 
r\ost substantial contacts . * * m nterest -^.einq 3* ~r i iA ; 
applied. 
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Finally, plaintiff has inappropriately raised a constitutional 
issue. This issue, however, is precluded by the general rule that 
constitutional equal protection issues raised for the first time on 
appeal cannot be considered by the appellate court unless they 
pertain to a person's loss of liberty. As such, this court cannot 
consider plaintiff's equal protection argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE UTAH APPLIES THE RULE OF LEX LOCI 
DELICTI, NEVADA LAW APPLIES TO 
PLAINTIFF'S TORT ACTION. 
On December 28, 1990, plaintiff filed his complaint against 
Layton Construction Company, alleging that Layton's Negligence 
caused plaintiff to suffer personal injuries. Although plaintiff's 
action was filed in Utah, the accident giving rise to the complaint 
occurred in Nevada. The issue, therefore, is which state's law 
should apply to the plaintiff's cause of action. 
In determining which state's law will apply, the conflict of 
laws rules of the forum state are determinative. Klaxom v. Stentor 
Electric Mfg. Co. . 313 U.S. 487, 491, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 
(1941) . As this case was filed in Utah, Utah's conflict of law 
rules apply. See Buhler v. Maddison, 176 P.2d 118, 109 Utah 267 
(1947) . 
When faced with a tort claim where the injury occurs outside 
the state, Utah courts apply the law of the state of injury, 
8 
otherwise known as the rule of lex loci delicti. Madison v. 
Deseret Livestock Co. , 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978); Valasouez v. 
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 366 P.2d 989, 12 Utah 2d 379 (1961) 
(overruled on other grounds) (671 P.2d 217). Under the lex loci 
doctrine, the forum state will apply the law of the state of the 
injury to determine plaintiff's ability to maintain his tort suit. 
Accordingly, as the accident occurred in Nevada, plaintiff's claim 
for personal injuries in this matter is governed by Nevada law. 
Under Nevada law, employers are immune from common-law 
liability for injuries suffered by their employees arising out of 
and in the course of employment. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.270 (1986). 
(attached as Exhibit "A"). Nevada law also provides that all 
subcontractors and their employees are deemed to be employees of 
the principal contractor. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.085 (Supp. 1989) 
(attached as Exhibit "B"). Accordingly, under Nevada law, 
plaintiff is deemed to be an employee of Layton Construction, the 
general contractor. Titanium Metals Corp. of America v. Eighth 
Judicial Dist. Court, 349 P.2d 444, 76 Nev. 72 (I960).1 Therefore, 
1
 Although Nevada law provides an exception to this rule in 
the case of employees hired outside of the state who are 
temporarily within the state, this exception does not 
apply to employees of a contractor on a project whose 
cost as a whole exceeds $250,000. Nevada Revised Statute 
§ 616.260(1); 616.260(3) (attached as Exhibit MCff) . 
Because the cost of the construction project in Nevada 
was approximately $17,000,000, this exception does not 
apply. 
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as the employer of plaintiff, Layton Construction is shielded from 
common-law tort liability for plaintiff's personal injuries 
incurred in the course and scope of his employment. 
II. THE LEX LOCI DELICTI RULE FOLLOWED BY 
UTAH COURTS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE 
PROVISION OF UTAH'S WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
ACT WHICH ALLOWS AN EMPLOYEE TO OBTAIN 
"COMPENSATION" FOR HIS OUT-OF-STATE 
INJURY. 
In order to avoid the effect of Utah's adherence to the rule 
of lex loci delicti, plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to recast 
the issue in this case as being a worker's compensation conflict of 
law question. Although probably irrelevant, plaintiff has gone so 
far as to misstate in his Statement of Facts that he filed this 
action for negligence "pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-62 [attached as Exhibit "D"] ... to recover 
damages from negligent third parties including the defendants." 
Compare Appellant's Brief at p. 7 with R. 2-7, 12-18. Plaintiff 
clearly did not mention the statute in his pleadings. 
Plaintiff now argues that Section 35-1-54 of the Utah's 
Worker's Compensation Act allows him to maintain a negligence claim 
against defendants by statutory exception to the general rule of 
Lex Loci Delicti. That section provides: 
If an employee who has been hired or is 
regularly employed in this state, receives 
personal injury by accident arising out of and 
in the course of such employment outside of 
10 
the state, he, or his dependents, in case of 
his death, shall be entitled to compensation 
according to the law of this state• 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54 (emphasis added) (attached as Exhibit 
"E") . Plaintiff's assertion, however, depends on too broad of 
reading of that Section. 
Section 35-1-54 addresses the issue of what law will govern an 
injured party's entitlement to worker's "compensation" benefits. 
It requires, as to a Utah employee, that Utah law governs the 
entitlement to worker's compensation benefits, regardless of the 
state in which he or she is injured. This makes sense; Utah has a 
legitimate interest in assuring that Utah workers, who are injured 
out of state, will receive at least the minimum statutory support 
guaranteed by Utah law. After all, such workers will presumably 
return to Utah to live and must be assured that they receive 
compensation for their work related injuries in light of the cost 
of living in Utah. 
The issue in this case, however, is not whether sufficient 
compensation benefits will be provided to the injured worker. 
After all, plaintiff has already received such benefits pursuant to 
Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. (R. 146). Rather, the issue 
here is whether Nevada law allows plaintiff to maintain his common-
law tort claim. Section 35-1-54, however, has no impact on this 
latter issue. 
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This conclusion is clear from the definition given the term 
"compensation" in Section 3 5-1-44 of the Utah Worker's Compensation 
Code. That statute defines the term "compensation" as "the 
payments and benefits provided for in this title." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-44 (attached as Exhibit "F"). This definition clearly 
indicates that the term "compensation," as used in Section 35-1-54, 
refers only to entitlement to Worker's Compensation benefits and 
rate of compensation. 
To avoid this straightforward reading of the statute, plain-
tiff has cited a Wyoming case and the model Worker's Compensation 
Act to support his argument that "compensation" and "benefits" 
includes the right to maintain a common-law tort action. However, 
when faced with this identical argument, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "benefits" under the 
Worker's Compensation Act could not sensibly be interpreted to 
include a common-law tort action. Woodner v. Mather. 210 F.2d 868, 
871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Similarly, Section 35-1-54 only addresses 
the issue of what state's law will apply to an injured party's 
worker's compensation benefits. It does not have any impact on the 
pivotal issue of what tort law a Utah court will apply when the 
injury occurred out of its jurisdiction. That issue, as explained 
above, is governed by the rule of lex loci delicti. 
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This interpretation also squares with Nevada's worker's 
compensation law. Nevada specifically recognizes other states' 
interests in regulating the worker's compensation benefits for out-
of-state employees injured in Nevada. Section 616.2 60 of Nevada's 
Revised Statues exempts non-residents from the provisions of the 
Nevada worker's compensation laws if the employer has furnished 
worker's compensation insurance under the applicable law of the 
other state. See § 616.260 (attached as Exhibit "C"). However, 
Section 616.085, which defines "employee" for the purpose of 
immunity from civil liability, contains no exception for injuries 
involving out-of-state employees. See § 616.085 attached as 
Exhibit "B"). These provisions reflect an assumption on the part 
of the drafters of the statute that Nevada law should not apply to 
worker's compensation benefits payable to out-of-state employees, 
but should apply to the employee's general tort remedy. 
Moreover, Nevada law contains an exception to extra-
territorial application of another state's worker's compensation 
law. That exception, contained in Nevada Review Statute, 
§ 616.260(3) provides that another state's worker's compensation 
law shall not apply to employees of a contractor on a project whose 
cost as a whole exceeds $250,000. This exception clearly makes the 
exclusive remedy provision of Nevada's worker's compensation law 
apply to all employees injured in the state of Nevada on major 
13 
projects, regardless of the state of domicile of the employee. The 
exception applies here where the cost of the project exceeded $17 
million. 
The plaintiff's interpretation of Utah's statute, on the other 
hand, not only requires too broad of reading of Section 35-1-54, 
but also makes no sense in terms of policy. Under the plaintiff's 
interpretation, a Nevada contractor's immunity from suit would 
depend upon the state in which the injured party was hired. For 
example, there is no question that a Nevada contractor who hires 
all Nevada subcontractors would be immune from suit by a sub-
contractor's employee for a work related injury. However, under 
the plaintiff's reading of the law, a Nevada contractor who hired 
a Utah subcontractor would lose that immunity regarding injuries 
suffered by the Utah subcontractor's employees. Presumably, the 
situation would be the same as to subcontractors having employees 
from other states with statutory provisions similar to Utah's. 
Clearly, neither Utah nor Nevada law could have intended this 
result. In fact, the likely impact of such a scenario would 
create a huge disincentive for Nevada contractors to hire 
subcontractors from Utah. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's reliance on Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 110 Utah 328, 172 P.2d 669 (1946), is misplaced. That 
court merely addressed the issue of whether the Utah Industrial 
14 
Commission had jurisdiction to award compensation benefits to an 
employee hired in the state of Utah whose injury was sustained in 
another state. The Allen court held that the Utah Industrial 
Commission does have jurisdiction in such a case. Allen did not 
involve the issue of which state's law would govern the injured 
party's tort claim. 
Additionally, Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P. 2d 1363 (Wyo. 
1988), is similarly inapplicable. In Mapco, the choice of law 
provisions of the two states concerned (Colorado and Wyoming) were 
different from the choice of law provisions at issue here. The 
Wyoming statute, found controlling in Mapco, was much broader than 
Utah's statute, Section 35-1-54. The Wyoming statute's was not 
confined to "compensation"2 as defined in Utah's act. The Mapco 
2That statute provided: If an employee, while working outside 
of the territorial limits of this state, suffers an injury on 
account of which he, or in the event of his death, his dependents, 
would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this act [§§ 
27-12-101 through 27-12-804] had the injury occurred within this 
state, the employee, or in the event of his death, resulting from 
the injury, his dependents, are entitled to the benefits provided 
by this act, if at the time of the injury: 
(i) His employment is principally localized in this 
state; 
(ii) He is working under a contract of hire made in this 
state in employment not principally localized in any 
state; or 
(iii) He is working under a contract of hire made in 
this state in employment principally localized in another 
state whose worker's compensation law is not applicable 
15 
court interpreted its act to encompass not only the rate of 
compensation, but the statutory immunity provisions as well. 
Because Utah's statute is much narrower, Mapco has no application. 
III. THE SIGNIFICANT CONTACTS TEST SUGGESTED 
BY PLAINTIFF WOULD PRODUCE THE SAME 
RESULTS. 
Authorities relied upon by plaintiff represent the 
"significant contacts" or "interest" approach used by some courts. 
That rule is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of 
Laws, Section 145(2) as follows: 
(1) The place where the injury occurred; 
(2) The place where the conduct causing the 
injury occurred; 
(3) The domicile, residence, nationality, 
place of incorporation and place of business 
of the parties, and 
(4) The place where the relationship, if any, 
between the parties is centered. 
Under the facts of the present matter, and as previously 
detailed, it is conceded that the first two factors (place of 
injury and place of conduct) were located in Nevada. The third 
to his employer. 
§ 27-12-208(a) Wyo. Stat. (Supp. 1983). 
16 
factor (domicile or place of business of parties) is plaintiff's 
only argument. However, the place where the relationship of the 
parties at the time of the accident was centered was clearly in 
Nevada. Moreover, not all the parties were Utah companies. At 
least one of the parties to this action, Bilt-Rite Concrete, Inc., 
is a Nevada company. The fourth factor, the place where the 
parties7 relationship is centered, clearly also is State of Nevada. 
Therefore, even under the significant contacts approach, Nevada 
clearly has a stronger relationship to this accident than does the 
State of Utah. Furthermore, the State of Nevada is the owner of 
the project. A more compelling reason to apply Nevada law can 
hardly be imagined. 
Under the "contacts" or "interests" approach, Nevada worker's 
compensation law should apply to determine the extent of the 
worker's compensation exclusive remedy. This was the same 
conclusion reached by the Nevada Supreme Court in Tab Construction 
Co. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 83 Nev. 364, 432 P.2d 90 
(1967). In that case, the employee of an Arizona subcontractor was 
injured on a construction project in Nevada. He brought a civil 
action against the Nevada general contractor and several of its 
employees. Under Arizona law, like Utah law, such a suit was 
allowed. Nevada law, however, barred such claims. The Nevada 
Supreme Court held that Nevada law would apply to bar the suit. 
17 
The following factors, among others, were key to the Court's 
decision: The general contractor on the project was a Nevada 
resident, his business was localized in Nevada, the alleged 
negligent act and the injury occurred in Nevada. Based in part on 
these factors, the Court observed that, "the State of Nevada has a 
legitimate constitutional interest in application of its own 
domestic law and policy to a work injury occurring within its 
borders." Tab Construction, 432 P.2d at 91. 
In the case at bar, although the general contractor is not a 
resident of Nevada, Nevada was the owner of the project. (R. 140) . 
If the State of Nevada does not have a sufficient interest in 
having its own law apply to a state owned prison project then it is 
hard to imagine who does. Furthermore, both the alleged negligent 
act and the injury occurred in Nevada. Also, plaintiff's presence 
in Nevada was not a fortuitous circumstance, such as being involved 
in an automobile accident while driving through the state. Here, 
plaintiff purposefully took advantage of Nevada's benefits: First, 
plaintiff chose to work for Harv & Higham in Nevada even though he 
could have worked for that company in Salt Lake City, Ogden, or 
Orem, Utah. See R. 377. Second, plaintiff received substantially 
more money by working in Nevada rather than Utah. See R. 378. 
Finally, plaintiff joined a Nevada union in Reno, Nevada, in order 
to earn this higher income. Id. In sum, plaintiff purposefully 
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availed himself of Nevada's benefits, he then came home to Utah to 
collect worker's compensation benefits and now wants to maintain an 
action in Utah's courts to further compensate him for his Nevada 
injury. 
Based on the foregoing facts, it is clear that even if this 
court chooses to adopt plaintiff's "substantial contacts" or 
"interests" rule, that Nevada, not Utah, has the most substantial 
interests in seeing that Nevada law applies. As noted earlier, a 
contrary conclusion would erect a serious impediment to Utah 
companies and employees who want to work in Nevada. Nevada 
companies would be unlikely to hire Utah companies (and their 
employees) because those employees could make an end-run around 
Nevada's worker's compensation law by collecting benefits in Utah 
and then suing the general contractors and other subcontractors in 
Utah. Clearly this was not the intent of the Utah legislature. 
IV. PLAINTIFF HAS INAPPROPRIATELY ARGUED A 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE. 
In his opposing memorandum, plaintiff has argued that 
"[ajlthough no constitutional issues were raised before the trial 
court, the denial of Shaw's right to bring and maintain this 
lawsuit may constitute a violation of the Equal Protection 
provisions of both the United States and Utah Constitutions." 
Appellant's Brief at 21. Plaintiff, however, failed to raise the 
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issue in the lower court and has completely failed to adequately 
brief this issue on appeal or to include it as an issue in his 
brief. As such, this court cannot reach this issue on appeal. See 
State v. Yates, 189 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Utah 
Rules App. Proc, Rule 24(a)(9). Moreover, if constitutional 
issues are not raised before its lower court, an appellant cannot 
raise them on appeal unless a person's liberty is at stake. Pratt 
v. City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981). Nevertheless, on 
the merits, appellant has not raised a legitimate constitutional 
issue. That is, under either state's law, all employees from Utah 
are treated similarly. Thus, there is no equal protection issue. 
Should this court decide to entertain this issue, however, appellee 
requests that it be allowed to further address this question. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah adheres to the lex loci delicti rule. As such, 
plaintiff's tort claim is barred by Nevada law. "Compensation," as 
allowed under Utah's statute, refers to worker's compensation 
benefits and not the right to maintain a common-law tort action. 
However, even if this court adopts plaintiff's "significant 
contacts" or "interests" approach, Nevada law should be applied 
because of the numerous contacts and interests tied to Nevada. 
As a matter of policy, plaintiff's position would do Utahan's 
a serious disservice. Nevada companies would avoid hiring Utah 
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subcontractors due to the risk of being sued. Also, although 
plaintiff's proffered solution would seem to allow the greatest 
rights to injured Utahans, this would not necessarily be true under 
different facts. For example, if plaintiff were injured through 
his own fault and his immediate employer failed to provide worker's 
compensation benefits and was financially defunct, plaintiff would 
recover nothing under his approach. In that situation, plaintiff 
would likely argue that Nevada law should apply, which requires the 
statutory employer to guarantee worker's compensation benefits. 
Finally, Lex Loci provides a clearly understandable test which 
parties can rely upon and would prevent forum shopping by parties 
such as plaintiff. 
DATED this ^Z day of October, 1993. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Layton Construction Company Inc. 
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616.270 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATION.* 616.270 
616.270. Employers to provide compensation: rei:-; ->om liability. 
1. Every employer within the provisions of thi.^  chapter, and those 
employers who shall accept the terms of this chapter and be governed by its 
provisions, as in this chapter provided, shall provide and secure compensation 
according to the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter for any and 
all personal injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and 
in the course of the employment. 
2. Travel for which an employee receives wages shall, for the purposes of 
this chapter, be deemed in the course of employment. 
3. In such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability for 
recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal injury, unless by 
the terms of this chapter otherwise provided. (1947, p. 572; CL 1929 (1949 
Supp.), § 2680.26; 1971, p. 2058.) 
CASE NOTES 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Injury Arising Out of and In Course of Employment. 
III. Exclusivity of Act. 
IV. Provision of Coverage by Employer. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. 
Cited in: Simon Serv. Inc. v. Mitchell, 73 
Nev. 9. 307 P.2d 110 (1957); Tab Constr. Co. v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 83 Nev. 364. 432 
P.2d 90 (1967); Heitman v. Bank of Las Vegas, 
87 Nev. 201, 484 P.2d 572 (1971); Nevada 
Indus. Comm'n v. Reese. 93 Nev. 115. 560 P.2d 
1352 (1977i; Spencer v. Harrah's Inc.. 9S Nev. 
99, 641 P.2d 481 (1952); Lewis v. United 
States. 680 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 19821. 
II. INJURY ARISING OUT OF AND IN 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. 
Negligence of fellow employee. — When 
an employee is injured on the job as a result of 
the negligence of a fellow employee, his rem-
edy is compensation under the Nevada Indus-
trial Insurance Act. Leslie v. J.A. Tiberti 
Constr. Co., 99 Nev. 494. 664 P.2d 963 (1983). 
Assault while at work. — Where an em-
ployee is assaulted and injury is inflicted upon 
him through animosity and ill will arising 
from some cause wholly disconnected with the 
employer's business or the employment, the 
employee cannot recover compensation simply 
because he is assaulted when he is in the 
discharge of his duties. Under such circum-
stances, the injury* does not arise out of the 
course of employment, and the employment is 
not the cause of the injury, althoueh it may be 
the occasion of the willful act and may furnish 
the opportunity for its execution. McColl v. 
Scherer. 73 Nev. 226. 315 P.2d 807 11957). 
Assault by insane coemployee. — Em-
ployee's death, as a matter of law. arose out of 
the employment, where he was assaulted in 
the course of his employment by an insane 
fellow emplovee. Cummines v. United Resort 
Hotels. Inc., 85 Nev. 23. 449 P 2d 245 (1969). 
Shooting of employee. — In a personal 
injury action brought against a ciub owner by 
a waitress who was snot by a customer while 
on dutv. summary juaernent for the employer 
on CTounds that she was covered by the Indus-
trial Insurance Act was improper, where there 
was no determination as to whetner her injury 
resulted from beinc placed in a position of 
dancer by reason of her employment or was the 
result of enmity, gruaee. or other personal 
relationship. McColl v. Scherer. 73 Nev. 226, 
315 P.2d 807 (1957). 
Recreational activity. — Recreational ac-
tivity snould not be deemed to be within the 
course of employment unless it is a regular 
incident of employment, or is required bv the 
employer, or is of direct benefit to the employei 
beyond the intangible value of employe* 
health and morale common to all kinds o 
recreation and social life; thus, where it wa.' 
not a regular incident of employee's employ 
ment to enjoy recreation on his day off at gol 
driving range, and his employer did not re 
quire his presence there, nor did the employe 
receive a direct benefit from that off-dut; 
activity beyond the intangible value of em 




616.084 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 616.085 
Cross references . — As to determination of 
disability for vocational rehabilitation, see 
NRS 615.220. 
616.084. "Employee": Volunteer workers at Nevada mental health 
institute. 
Volunteer workers at the Nevada mental health institute, while acting 
under the direction or authorization of the supervisor of volunteer services of 
the mental health institute, shall be deemed, for the purpose of this chapter, 
employees of the Nevada mental health institute in the mental hygiene and 
mental retardation division .of the department of human resources, receiving a 
wage of S350 per month, and shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter 
upon compliance therewith by the Nevada mental health institute. (1969, p. 
236; 1973, pp. 118,1406.) 
Cross re fe rences . — As to labor by clients 
of mental health centers, see NRS 433.524. 
616.085. "Employee": Subcontractors and employees. 
Subcontractors and their employees shall be deemed to be employees of the 
principal contractor. (1947, p. 571; 1951, p. 485.) 
CASE NOTES 
Cons t i tu t iona l i ty . — This section and NRS 
616.115 neither compel an employee to labor 
against his will, for the benefit of another, nor 
prohibit or restrict any employee from leaving 
the service of the employer, and thus do not 
violate the involuntary servitude provisions of 
either the federal or state Constitutions. 
Cavagnaro v. State Wide Investigations, Inc., 
94 Nev. 467, 581 P.2d 859 (1978). " 
Nevada's Industrial Insurance Act is 
unique ly different from the industrial insur-
ance acts of other states in that independent 
contractors and subcontractors by NRS 
616.115 and this section are accorded the 
status of emplovees. Noland v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 97 Nev. 268. 628 P.2d 1123 H981). 
P u r p o s e . — The purpose of this section is, 
at least in part, to protect the employees of 
subcontractors against the possible 
irresponsibility of their immediate employers, 
by making the principal contractor or principal 
employer having general control of the con-
struction liable as if he had directly employed 
every worker on the job. Simon Serv. Inc. v. 
Mitchell, 73 Nev. 9, 307 P.2d 110 (1957). 
In order to make the determination of 
which types of subcontractors and inde-
pendent contractors are covered and thus 
immune from liability, it is necessary to make 
an initial determination as to the statutory 
employer; the type of work performed by the 
subcontractor or independent contractor will 
determine whether the employer is the statu-
tory employer. Meers v. Haughton Elevator, — 
Nev.— .'701 P.2d 1006 • 1985). 
Owner who ac ts as genera l con t r ac to r or 
principal employer . — The 1951 amendment 
to this section, which deleted "or other person 
having the work done" from the end thereof, 
eliminated an owner whose only status was as 
owner, but who might be said, as such owner, 
to be the person having the work done. How-
ever, when that owner assumed the additional 
status of being principal employer or principal 
contractor, he was not eliminated just because 
he was also the owner. Simon v. Serv. Inc. v. 
Mitchell. 73 Nev. 9, 307 P.2d 110 (1957). 
Where a defendant owner, in constructing a 
building, entered into separate contracts, the 
fact that defendant was a general contractor or 
principal employer would preclude an em-
ployee of another contractor who suffered inju-
ries in the course of his employment and 
accepted benefits under the Industrial Insur-
ance Act from recovenng at common law from 




616.255 INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 616.260 
SCOPE AND OPERATION 
616.255. Applicability to interstate commerce and certain plans for 
benefits in effect before July 1, 1947. 
LEGAL PERIODICALS 
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation, 
Health and Welfare, 1987 Pac. L.J. Rev. Nev. 
Legis. 117. 
616.256. Plans for benefits in effect before July 1, 1947: Determination 
of sufficiency; applicability of chapter. 
LEGAL PERIODICALS 
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation, 
Health and Welfare, 1987 Pac. L.J. Rev. Nev. 
Legis. 117. 
616.260. Exemption of employer and employee temporarily within 
state; exception; effect of employee working in another 
state where coverage required. 
I 1. Except as limited in subsection 3, any employee who has been hired 
I outside of this state and his employer are exempted from the provisions of this 
I chapter while the employee is temporarily within this state doing work for his 
| employer if his employer has furnished industrial insurance coverage under 
• the industrial insurance act or similar laws of a state other than Nevada so as 
i.to cover the employee's employment while in this state, provided; 
(a) The extraterritorial provisions of this chapter are recognized in the 
j^other state; and 
/ (b) Employers and employees who are covered in this state are likewise 
/ exempted from the application of the industrial insurance act or similar 
Claws of the other state. 
The benefits under the industrial insurance act or similar laws of the other 
state are the exclusive remedy against the employer for any injury, whether 
resulting in death or not, received by the employee while working for the 
employer in this state. 
2. A certificate from the administrator or similar officer of another state 
certifying that the employer of the other state is insured therein and has 
provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his employees while working 
within this state is prima facie evidence that the employer carried the indus-
trial insurance. 
| ^ 3. The exemption provided for in this section does not apply to the em-
\ ployees of a contractor, as defined in NRS 624.020, operating within the scope 
\jmj){ his license on a project whose cost as a whole exceeds $250,000. 
4. An employer is not required to pay premiums to the system for an em-
ployee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state, but who is 
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616.263 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIG 616.265 
performing work exclusively in another state, if the other state requires the 
employer to provide coverage for the employee in the other state. If the em-
ployee receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, any claim for compensation must be filed in the state in 
which the accident occurred, and such compensation is the exclusive remedy 
of the employee or his dependents. This subsection does not prevent an em-
ployer from maintaining coverage for the employee under the provisions of 
this chapter. (1947, p. 594: 1955, p. 187; 1981, p. 1464; 1989. ch. 276, § 1, p. 
578; 1989, ch. 325, § 1, p. 682.1 
Editor's note. — This section was amended ment by ch. 276, § 1. as amended by ch. 325, 
by two 1989 acts which do not appear to con- § 1, in the introductory paragraph of subsec-
flict and have been compiled together. tion 1, added "Except as limited in subsection 
Effective date. — Acts 1989, ch. 276. § 1 3" at the beginning of the paragraph: added 
became effective October 1, 1989. Acts 1989. the present subdivision ltai and redesignated 
ch. 325, § 1, became effective June 13, 1989, the former subdivisions lia* and Kb) as the 
pursuant to ch. 325, § 2. present subdivisions Kb) and l(o, respectively, 
Effect of amendment. — The 1989 amend- and added subsections 3 and 4. 
616.263. Real estate broker or salesman who hires independent con-
tractor not considered employer. 
Any person licensed pursuant to the provisions of chapter 645 of NRS who 
engages an independent contractor to maintain or repair property on behalf of 
an individual property owner or an association of property owners is not a 
statutory employer for the purposes of this chapter. (1987, ch. 199, § 4, p. 
450.) 
LEGAL PERIODICALS 
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation, 
Worker's Compensation, 19S7 Pac. L.J. Rev. 
Nev. Legis. 219. 
616.265. Devices modifying liability void; exception. 
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2: 
(a) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any 
other device, does not modify, change or waive any liability created by this 
chapter. 
(b) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any 
other device, having for its purpose the waiver or modification of the terms 
or liability created by this chapter is void. 
2. Nothing in this section prevents an owner or lessor of real property from 
requiring an employer who is leasing the real property from agreeing to in-
sure the owner or lessor of the property against any liability for repair or 
maintenance of the premises. (1947, p. 572; CL 1929 (1949 Supp.), § 2680.25; 




35-1-62 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
Historv: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 72; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3133; L 1921, ch. 100, $ 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, $ 3; 1973. 
ch. 67, $ 7; 1975, ch. 101, $ 3. 
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Exhibit E 
35-1-54 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-54. Employee injured outside state — Entitled to com-
pensation — Limitation of time. 
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state 
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such 
employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in case of his death, 
shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. This 
provision shall apply only to those injuries received by the employee within 
six months after leaving this state, unless prior to the expiration of such six 
months period the employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 65; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3126; R.S. 1933, 42-1-52; L. 1941, ch. 37, 
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-52. 
ANALYSIS 
Employees of foreign corporation. 
Foreign compensation laws. 
Injuries in interstate commerce. 
Operation and eilect. 
Words and phrases defined. 
Cited. 
Employees of foreign corporation. 
Since relation of employer and employee ex-
isted between foreign transportation company 
and truck driver in this state at time of injury, 
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to 
make award, and such power in nowise de-
pended upon reading into his contract of em-
ployment the law of Colorado where the con-
tract was made, for when employer sent his 
employee into Utah to work for it there, it sub-
jected itself to this chapter. Buckingham 
Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 
342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937). 
Employer or its insurance carrier are not re-
quired to make payments to injury benefit fund 
where airline stewardess, employed in Califor-
nia by employer with its principal offices in 
California, is killed in course of temporary em-
ployment in Utah leaving no surviving depen-
dents. United Air Lines Transp. Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 110 Utah 590, 175 P.2d 752 
(1946). 
Foreign compensation laws. 
In action by employee for personal injuries 
arising in state of Wyoming, defense that Wyo-
ming had adopted Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and that such act furnished adequate and 
exclusive remedy to employee to recover com-
pensation, was sustained. Bozo v. Central Coal 
& Coke Co., 54 Utah 289. ISO P. 432 (1919). 
Resident employee who was injured in 
course of employment in another state was en-
titled to compensation for such injuries, al-
though employer was insured under laws of 
other state. Pickering v. Industrial Commn. 59 
Utah 35, 201 P. 1029 (1921). 
In the absence of proof it will be presumed 
that the provisions of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of another state are the same as 
those of the forum. Shurtliflf v. Oregon Short 
Line R.R., 66 Utah 161, 241 P. 1058 (1925). 
Injuries in interstate commerce. 
Industrial Commission had power to make 
award under this section for injury to trucker 
employed by foreign corporation under foreign 
contract notwithstanding that trucker was in 
interstate commerce when injured. Bucking-
ham Transp. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 93 
Utah 342, 72 P.2d 1077 (1937). 
Operation and effect. 
If employer-employee relationship is main-
tained in this state. Industrial Commission has 
jurisdiction to make an award notwithstanding 
that original contract of employment was en-
tered into in foreign state and that injury oc-
curred in foreign state. Fav v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P.2d 508 (1941). 
Commission had right to award compensa-
tion for death of salesman occurring in Idaho, 
under first sentence of this section, notwith-
standing that original contract of employment 
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Exhibit F 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-44 
Educ. of Alpine School Dist. v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1984). 
Welfare or relief recipients. 
Under voluntary arrangement between two 
state agencies, state fair association and public 
welfare department, pursuant to latter's plan 
to compel welfare recipients who were able to 
work to work out their relief payments on cer-
tain projects, whereby such recipients were di-
rected to report to association for work and 
were placed by latter under supervision and 
control of its superintendent of fairgrounds at 
work having substantial economic value to as-
35-1-44L Definition of terms. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3112; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1943, 42-1-42. 
sociation, recipient was "employee," associa-
tion was "employer" and "contract of hire" ex-
isted within meaning of this section, as 
amended in 1945, so as to entitle injured recip-
ient to compensation, where association was 
required by welfare commission to furnish 
compensation insurance for such workers, and 
had right to hire, fire, control, supervise and 
regulate pay of them, although payment of 
compensation and relief payments were made 
by welfare board. Commission of Fin. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 113 Utah 73, 191 P.2d 598 
(1948). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 59 et seq. <*= 230. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be construed as follows: 
(1) "Order" shall mean and include any decision, rule, regulation, di-
rection, requirement or standard of the commission, or any other determi-
nation arrived at, or decision made, by such commission. 
(2) "General order" shall mean and include an order applying gener-
ally throughout the state to all persons, employments or places of employ-
ment of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All other orders 
of the commission shall be considered special orders. 
(3) "Welfare" shall mean and include comfort, decency and moral well-
being. 
(4) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of em-
ployment, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health or 
welfare of employees as the nature of the employment will reasonably 
permit. 
(5) "Personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of em-
ployment" shall include any injury caused by the willful act of a third 
person directed against an employee because of his employment. It shall 
not include a disease, except as it shall result from the injury. 
(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments and benefits provided for 
in this title. 
(7) "Award" shall mean the finding or decision of the commission as to 
the amount of compensation due any injured, or the dependents of any 
deceased, employee. 
(8) "Average weekly earnings" shall mean the average weekly earn-
ings arrived at by the rules provided in Section 35-1-75. 
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